Standard macro models cannot explain why real exchange rates are volatile and disconnected from macro aggregates. Recent research argues that models with persistent growth rate shocks and recursive preferences can solve that puzzle. I show that this result is highly sensitive to the structure of financial markets. When just a bond is traded internationally, then long-run risk generates insufficient exchange rate volatility. A longrun risk model with recursive-preferences can generate realistic exchange rate volatility, if all agents efficiently share their consumption risk by trading in complete financial markets; however, this entails massive international wealth transfers, and excessive swings in net foreign asset positions. By contrast, a long-run risk, recursive-preferences model in which only a fraction of households trades in complete markets, while the remaining households lead hand-to-mouth lives, can generate realistic exchange rate and external balance volatility.
Introduction
Real exchange rates among the major currencies are volatile and seem disconnected from macro aggregates. Standard macroeconomics models fail to explain these facts (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) ). As the exchange rate is one of the key relative prices in an economy, conventional theory predicts that exchange rate movements are closely linked to fluctuations in aggregate demand and supply. For example, standard models predict that households can hedge country-specific output risk, by trading in international financial markets. Under conventional time-separable household preferences, the rate of real exchange rate appreciation is, thus, predicted to be perfectly negatively correlated with relative domestic/foreign consumption growth (Kollmann (1991 (Kollmann ( , 1995 , Backus and Smith (1993) ). Yet, empirically, the real exchange rate is uncorrelated with relative consumption, and also much more volatile than consumption.
Recent research shows that models with recursive (non-separable) preferences of the Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989 Weil ( , 1990 ) type can generate realistic exchange rate volatility, if agents face 'long-run risk' (persistent growth rate shocks) that is efficiently shared, using complete global financial markets. See, e.g., Kollmann (2009) , Croce (2011, 2013) , Lewis and Liu (2012) , Gourio et al. (2013) , Caporale et al. (2014) and Sauzet (2014) . Recursive preferences allow the coefficient of risk aversion to differ from the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which entails that a household's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption (IMRS) depends on her expected life-time utility. Efficient risk sharing implies that the ratio of the domestic IMRS to the foreign IMRS is equated to the growth factor of the real exchange rate. With recursive preferences, persistent shocks to output growth generate wide fluctuations in the relative (domestic/foreign) IMRS, and hence in the real exchange rate, when consumption risk is efficiently shared. Importantly, in a world with long-run risk and recursive preferences, exchange rate fluctuations are potentially only weakly correlated with current (relative) consumption or output growth. This paper offers a critical assessment of the role of long-run risk and recursive preferences for exchange rate dynamics. I show that this role is highly sensitive to the structure of international financial markets. I document that when global financial markets are incomplete, in the sense that just an unconditional bond can be traded 3 internationally, as widely assumed in macro theory (e.g., Kollmann (1995 Kollmann ( , 1996 , Baxter and Crucini (1995) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , Benigno and Thoenissen (2008) ) and in multi-country policy models (e.g., Erceg et al. (2006) , in't Veld et al. (2014) , Kollmann et al. (2015) ), then a model with long-run risk and recursive preferences generates insufficient real exchange rate volatility. A model with long-run risk and recursive preferences can generate realistic exchange rate volatility, when all agents can share their consumption risk by trading in complete markets. However, I show that this entails that country-specific output shocks trigger huge international wealth transfers, and thus induce vastly excessive swings in countries' net foreign asset positions.
I argue that within-country household heterogeneity in access to global financial markets is key for understanding the dynamics of the exchange rate and the external balance. I present a long-run risk, recursive-preferences model, in which only a fraction of households trades in complete markets ('risk-sharers'), while the remaining households lead hand-to-mouth (HTM) lives. The motivation for this structure is that, in reality, there is international trade in a wide array of state-contingent assets (equities, derivatives)-however, only a minority of households holds international assets (Christelis and Georgarakos (2009) ). I show that the model with two types of household can generate realistic volatility of the real exchange rate and of net foreign assets, if 'risksharers' only account for a small share of aggregate output. Redistributive shocks between HTM households and 'risk-sharer' households help to explain why the empirical correlation between relative consumption growth and real exchange rate growth is close to zero. 
respectively, i.e. a rise in RER represents an appreciation of the Home real exchange rate.
Input demands are:
,
The country i household has a recursive intertemporal utility function of the Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989 Weil ( , 1990 type: (Weil (1990) ). Country i's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) between aggregate consumption at t and t+1 is:
The baseline model assumes complete international financial markets, so that consumption risk is efficiently shared between Home and Foreign households. In equilibrium, the ratio of the two household's IMRSs is then equated to the growth factor of the real exchange rate (Kollmann (1991 (Kollmann ( , 1995 , Backus and Smith (1993) 
where Λ is a date-and state invariant quantity that depends on the (relative) wealth of the two countries. Hence, country H relative consumption growth is perfectly negatively correlated with the rate of appreciation of the country's real exchange rate, when
, as was first noted by Kollmann (1991 Kollmann ( , 1995 and Backus and Smith (1993 
Up to a linear approximation, the Home net exports/GDP ratio obeys Linearizing the risk-sharing condition (6) gives: Kollmann (1991 Kollmann ( , 1996 , Backus and Smith (1993) 
Thus, under recursive utility, the expected rate of real exchange rate appreciation is perfectly negatively correlated with the expected relative consumption growth rate, up to a first-order approximation. Using (8),
it can be shown that this implies: (9) and (10) imply:
where (10) and (11) show that the expected rate of real exchange rate appreciation depends on σ (inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity), but not on the risk aversion coefficient ;
γ however, γ affects the response of the real exchange rate to output surprises.
Consider a transitory positive innovation to Home relative output at t+1,
an innovation that does not change the expected path of output after date t+1. It follows from (8) and (11) 
Calibration

Preference and technology parameters
To facilitate comparison with related studies, I use the same baseline calibration as Colacito and Croce (2013) (that is based on US and UK data). One period represents one calendar year. The subjective discount factor is set at 0.98.
σ is set at 1.5 consistent with standard estimates of that parameter reported in the macro literature, while the risk aversion coefficient is set 8.
γ =
A high value of γ (greater than ) σ is needed to allow shocks to long-run output growth rates to generate sizable real exchange rate responses. The home bias parameter is set at 0.97, α = which implies that the steady state trade share (exports/GDP) is 3%. 4 The substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods is set at 1, φ= consistent with the fact that empirical estimate of the price elasticity of aggregate imports and exports are generally in the range of unity (as mentioned above).
Endowment processes
Following Colacito and Croce (2013) , the baseline model assumes that log output has a unit root, and is co-integrated across countries: ).
As a sensitivity analysis, I also consider two simpler exogenous processes of the type assumed in the international RBC literature (e.g., Kollmann (1996 Kollmann ( , 2009 ). The first of these processes assumes that log output is first-difference stationary (and cointegrated): I also consider a trend-stationary output process:
Linearly detrended annual log real GDP in the US and in the ROW during the period 
TS TS t t Corr ε ε =
For the sake of comparison with the baseline output process (12), I calibrate the standard deviations of the innovations of the alternative processes (13) and (14) (Adjemian et al. (2014) ). Simulations are based on the pruned state-space representation of the third-order accurate model solution (Kollmann (2005 (Kollmann ( , 2013 , Kim et al. (2008) , Andreasen et al. (2013) ).
Empirical volatility of net foreign assets and real exchange rates
In annual US data for 1980-2013, the standard deviations of NFA Δ (first-differenced net foreign assets/GDP ratio) and of NX (net exports/GDP) were 4.77% and 1.58%, respectively, while the standard deviation of the first-differenced log real effective exchange rate was 5.20%. 6 Note that the empirical standard deviation of US NFA Δ is close to the standard deviation of the annual rate of change of the US effective real exchange rate. Kollmann (2006) Table 1 reports model-predicted moments of key variables, while Table 2 shows dynamic responses to output innovations. The moments in Table 1 are averages computed across 6 The empirical measure of US NFA used here is the net international investment position reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA] . That series is based on market values of gross external assets and liabilities. One can interpret the first difference of NFA as the country's 'valuation adjusted' current account. That measure reflects capital gains/losses on external assets and liabilities; thus, it differs from the conventional current account reported in official balance of payments statistics, as the conventional measure equals the net flow of assets acquired by a country, and thus does not take into account capital gains/losses on external assets/liabilities acquired in the past (e.g., Kollmann (2006) and Coeurdacier et al. (2010) ). Annual U.S. GDP data (used for construction of ) NFA are also from BEA. The US empirical real effective exchange rate used here is the Federal Reserve Board's 'Price-adjusted Broad Dollar Index', Table H .10 (the published series has a monthly frequency; I construct an annual series by computing the average of the monthly observations in each calendar year). 12 500 stochastic simulation runs. Each simulation run is initialized at the deterministic steady state and has a length of 100 periods; the reported moments were computed using the last 50 periods only (to reduce dependence on initial conditions).
Model predictions
Model variants with efficient risk sharing
Panel (a) of Tables 1 shows predicted Home and Foreign consumption growth (see Columns (5)- (7)). The baseline model 7 These predicted statistics are close to those reported by Colacito and Croce (2013) (who also compute a third-order model approximation). 8 Empirically, and in the model, the level of the debt/GDP ratio NFA is highly persistent (Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests fail to reject the hypothesis that historical NFA has a unit root), which implies that the standard deviation (Std) of NFA is increasing in the sample length. Thus, I focus on moments of the firstdifference . NFA Δ Colacito and Croce (2013) [CC], instead, discuss moments of the level NFA (and not of ). NFA Δ According to CC (Table II) , the empirical Std of annual NFA was 34% in 1971-2008 (16 times the Std of GDP growth rate). CC state that this is the 'simple average of US and UK volatilities' based on the (updated) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) dataset [LMF] . However, using LMF data, I find that Stds of US and UK NFA were 10. 04% and 12.74%, respectively, 1971-2008 (5.0 and 6.4 13 predicts that relative consumption growth is uncorrelated with real exchange rate growth, and that consumption growth is weakly positively correlated across countries. These predictions are in line with the data (e.g., Kollmann (1991 Kollmann ( , 1995 , Backus and Smith (1993) ). However, the baseline model also predicts that expected relative consumption growth and expected real exchange rate growth are highly negatively correlated (-0.79).
With one exception (a structure with hand-to-mouth households), all other model variants discussed below likewise generate a strong negative correlation between expected relative consumption and real exchange rate growth. This is a counterfactual model property: Devereux et al. (2011) document empirically (using surveys of professional forecasts) that predicted relative consumption and real exchange rate growth are essentially uncorrelated.
A model variant with the simple difference-stationary stochastic process for output (13) too generates a highly volatile real exchange rate, and vastly excessive fluctuations of net foreign assets (see Table 1 , Line (a.3)). By contrast, a model version with the trend-stationary output process (14) under-predicts the standard deviations of these variables (see Table 1 , Line (a.4)). Table 1 These results confirm the recent literature (see Introduction) that has shown that a model with long-run risk, recursive preferences ( ) γ σ > and efficient risk sharing can generate a volatile real exchange rate. However, the simulations here identify a key shortcoming of the proposed mechanism that has not been noted so far, namely that it entails vastly excessive swings in countries' net foreign asset positions, and thus huge cross-country wealth transfers.
Line (a.2) of
14 The impulse responses reported in Table 2 help to understand these model features. γ σ > the impact response of relative consumption (0.78%) is much weaker than the rise in relative output; the responses of net exports (0.25% of GDP), the real exchange rate (-9.12%) and net foreign assets (-8.52% of GDP) are strong and persistent (see Table 2 Home real exchange rate depreciation, -1.22% (see Table 2 , Panel (a.2)).
In the baseline model ( ), γ σ > a one-standard deviation shock to the Home trend output growth rate , 0.26%
has an even more powerful effect on the real exchange rate, Home net exports and net foreign assets (than the transitory growth rate shock , ). ε has no effect on the real exchange rate, relative consumption and net exports, on impact (Table 2 
Model variants with financial frictions
Bonds-only economy
Many open economy models assume that global financial markets are incomplete, in the sense that just an unconditional bond can be traded internationally (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , Kollmann (1991 Kollmann ( , 1996 , Baxter and Crucini (1995) , Benigno and Thoenissen (2008) ). Line (b.1) of Table 1 reports predicted moments generated by a model variant in which the only traded asset is a one-period bond--otherwise this variant is identical to the baseline model with long-run run risk (output process (12)) and .
γ σ >
To maintain symmetry between the two countries, I assume that the bond is denominated in a basket consisting of half a unit of the Home output good, and half a unit of the Foreign good. Country i thus faces the budget constraint: 
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In the bonds-only set-up, the risk sharing condition (6) Line (b.1) of Table 1 shows that the bonds-only economy delivers much smaller cross-country wealth transfers than the structure with complete financial markets: the predicted standard deviation of net exports/GDP NX (0.05%) and of first-differenced net foreign assets/GDP NFA Δ (0.07%) are much smaller than in the structure with complete financial markets; real exchange rate growth too is much less volatile (standard deviation:
2.39%). Note that, in the bonds-only structure, these variables are also much less volatile than in the data. Furthermore, the rate of real exchange rate appreciation is now (almost) perfectly negatively correlated with relative consumption growth.
9
The Impulse responses in Table 2 ε too triggers only a 9 Hoffmann et al. (2011 ) study the effect of long-run growth shocks in a two-country, bonds-only model with one homogeneous tradable good; these authors show that long-run risk shocks can explain the sizable and persistent US trade balance deficits observed since the 1980s. (See also Equiza (2014) for a related set-up.) That one-good model cannot capture real exchange rate fluctuations. By contrast, the structure here assumes two country-specific output goods. When a high substitution elasticity φ between the two goods is assumed in the bonds-only model here, then the predicted variability of net exports and of net foreign assets increases, but the predicted variance of the real exchange rate falls, relative to the baseline calibration (where 1).
φ = E.g., for 100, φ = the bonds-only model here (with output process (12) and ) γ σ > generates realistic standard deviations of net exports/GDP (2.68%) and first differenced net foreign assets/GDP (3.36%), but the standard deviation of real exchange rate growth drops to 0.12%. Under complete markets, a model variant with 100 φ = predicts that the standard deviations of net exports, firstdifferenced net foreign assets and the real exchange rate are 26.13%, 555.36% and 0.39%, respectively. modest response of the real exchange rate, net exports and net foreign assets, in the bonds-only structure.
Heterogeneous households: risk-sharers and hand-to-mouth agents
The bonds-only structure may seem restrictive as, in reality, there is large-scale international trade in a wide array of state-contingent assets (equities, derivatives)-however, only a minority of households holds international assets (Christelis and Georgarakos (2009) Closed economy models with HTM households typically postulate that those households account for about 50% of aggregate income and consumption, in steady state; e.g., Gali et al. (2007) . On the other hand, very few households (directly) trade in foreign assets. E.g.,
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Christelis and Georgarakos (2004) and between expected growth rates of these variables are close to zero.
Conclusion
Recent research has argued that models with 'long-run risk' (persistent growth rate shocks) and recursive preferences can generate realistic exchange rate volatility, and solve other international finance puzzles. I have shown that this result hinges on the assumption that long-run consumption risk is efficiently shared among all (domestic and foreign) households. When financial markets are incomplete, in the sense that only an unconditional bond can be traded internationally, then long-run risk generates insufficient exchange rate volatility. I also document that a recursive preferences model, in which all households have access to complete global financial markets, entails implausibly large international wealth transfers in response to country-specific output growth rate shocks.
By contrast, a long-run risk, recursive-preferences model in which only a small fraction of households trades in complete markets, while the remaining households lead hand-tomouth lines, can generate realistic volatility of the real exchange rate and of net foreign assets.
12 Empirically, participation in financial markets is highly positively correlated with household wealth; households whose main source of income is labor income are much less likely to hold international assets (Christelis and Georgarakos (2009) ). Kollmann (2012) argues that, thus, fluctuations in the labor share may be taken as a proxy for movements in the fraction of GDP received by HTM households. I regressed the US labor share (compensation of employees/GDP) on a constant and the lagged share, using annual BEA data for 1980-2013 (NIPA Table 1 .10). The coefficient of the lagged share is 0.95, the Std of the regression residual is 0.59%.
with exp( (1 )).
β β μ σ ≡ ⋅ − Country i's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) between periods t and t+1 (see (5)) can be written as: • In model variants with efficient risk sharing, the net foreign assets/GDP ratio obeys ) . A third-order approximation is used to solve the model. Moments are averages computed across 500 stochastic simulation runs (each simulation run is initialized at the deterministic steady state and has a length of 100 periods; moments are computed using the last 50 periods only).
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